(0 )5 .5 6 . 8 4 .8 6 .4 7 -w w w . g r e t h a .f r La propagation des grandes idées? L'impact de l'activité de brevet des firmes leader sur les inventeurs locaux. 
Introduction 1
In a recent paper, Greenstone, Hornbeck and Moretti (2010, henceforth GHM) discuss the importance of understanding whether large plant openings raise the productivity of local incumbents.
They nd a substantial eect: ve years later the opening of a new large plant, the productivity of incumbent plants located in the same US county is 12% higher. The authors argue that the ndings are extremely relevant both for economic theory, since they provide evidence on the mechanisms underlying the agglomeration of economic activities, and for local development policies, which often subsidize the location of large industrial investments.
At least since Marshall (1890) , we know that knowledge spillovers are one of the leading mechanisms of agglomeration economics. This paper focuses primarily on this channel, expanding GHMs' analysis. Exploiting a rich patent database for the United States, I identify Top Inventing Companies ( henceforth TICs) by proxying the company size with the stock of owned patents. I then assess whether the aggregate number of patents developed by inventors working for TICs has any causal eect on the number of patents granted to other companies (non-TIC) located in the same Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). A priori, the eect is not necessarily positive:
in a general equilibrium framework, positive agglomeration externalities (knowledge spillovers, sharing and learning mechanisms) may be counterbalanced by upward pressures on nominal wages. Depending on the relative strength of the two mechanisms, the net eect could also be null or negative.
The results show that positive eects tend to prevail over negative ones at city level, and are stronger with a temporal lag. According to the regression results, a 10% increase in the number of TIC patents leads to an increase of about 2% in the number of non-TIC patents over the following 4-8 years. However, within narrowly dened technological sub-categories, where negative wage eects tend to be stronger due to a higher skill substitutability, the net eect is zero. One interpretation of these ndings, also supported by additional tests based on citation data, is that that Jacob-type knowledge spillovers, which are not conned within technological categories and may require more time to produce eects, tend to prevail over other more sectorspecic source of agglomeration economies, including sharing and matching mechanisms.
Using the NBER/USPTO patent database, I estimate a model where the number of non-TIC patents produced in a given city, time period, and technological category is a function of the 1 Acknowledgements: I thank Kristian Behrens, Chiara Criscuolo, Alfonso Gambardella, Bronwyn Hall, Andrea Lamorgese, Henry Overman, Olmo Silva, John Van Reenen, two anonymous referees, and participants to the Patents Statistics for Decision Makers conference (Paris, November 2012) and to the Zvi Griliches Seminar on Economics of Innovation (Barcelona, July 2011) for useful comments on previous versions of the paper. The views expressed in the article are those of the author and do not involve the responsibility of the OECD and the Bank of Italy. Usual disclaimers apply. 1 number of TIC patents developed in the same city, period, and category. I exploit the panel dimension of the dataset to account for time, city and technology xed eects. Causality is inferred with two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimations. The instrumental variable for TIC patents is based on the interaction of the historical presence of TICs in a given MSA with on contemporaneous variation in innovation activity of other plants of the same company. Consistently with economic theory, results show that positive eects prevail with a broad sectoral classication and a time lag, while negative eects are stronger in the short run and within narrow technological sectors. This evidence is suggestive of the relative importance of cross-industry knowledge spillovers as a source of agglomeration externalities. This paper lls in two important gaps in the related economic literature. First, by providing empirical evidence on the eect of the interaction of heterogeneous actors in cities, it improves our understanding of urban agglomeration. As Duranton and Puga (2004) forcefully argued, heterogeneity of workers and rms is at the root of most of the theories of urban agglomeration, as interactions within an army of clones would not theoretically motivate the existence of modern cities. It is therefore important to empirically investigate which level of heterogeneity really matters. Second, the study is related to the wide literature on the economics of innovation and patenting, by exploring under-investigated aspects of patent data, i.e., the skewness of the distribution of patents across inventors and companies.
The paper also oers interesting insights for policy. It is well known that innovation activity is highly concentrated in a small number of cities and regions; these spatial disparities have pushed a number of policies aimed at enhancing local innovation (Agrawal et al., 2012) , often based on subsidizing the location of R&D labs of large companies. Very little is known, however, about the eectiveness of these policies, i.e., whether they produce any additional eects on the innovation performance of local rms, or, rather, are just a windfall for large companies, at the taxpayer's cost. The ndings of this paper are on line with the general conclusions of many studies assessing the eect of cluster policies based on an agglomeration economies rationale.
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All in all, although there is a positive eect of TIC patents on non-TIC patents, this is likely to materialize in dierent sectors than those possibly targeted by the policy, and with some delay.
Furthermore, the fact that agglomeration economies are in place does not automatically imply that those can be easily triggered by ad-hoc policies.
The next paragraph reviews the relevant literature on patents and innovation; the third one introduces and discusses the denition of TICs; the fourth one describes the empirical methodology and the fth presents the results; the sixth paragraph concludes. 2 E.g.: Accetturo and de Blasio, 2012; Duranton, 2011; Martin, Mayer and Mayneris, 2011; Duranton, Mayer and Mayneris, 2010. 2 2 Patents, localized knowledge spillovers, and the size of innovation Patent data have become extremely popular in the economic literature in the last two decades, as they represent an easy and accessible way to proxy for innovation activity, which is otherwise generally very hard to measure. Furthermore, the availability of citation linkages further spurred more interest in patent data: for the rst time, researchers had a tool to "trace" knowledge spillovers, which previously had been considered one of the most dicult variable to dene empirically. A popular book by Jae and Trajtenberg (2005) , and the free availability of the USTPO dataset from the NBER website, also contributed to multiply the empirical applications based on patent data.
A signicant part of this literature has focused on the geographic component of innovation, with a particular interest in the spatial decay of knowledge spillovers. A seminal contribution by Jae et al. (1993) shows that a cited-citing patent couple is twice as likely to be located in the same US metropolitan area as a couple of technologically similar patents with no citation links.
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Similarly, Peri (2005) examines the ows of citations among 147 European and US regions to nd that "only 20% of average knowledge is learned outside the average region of origin", and Jae (1989) demonstrates that academic research has large eects on the number of private patents developed in the same US state. Finally, Carlino et al. (2007) use patent data for a cross-section of US metropolitan areas to investigate the relationship between urban density and innovation intensity (as measured by patents per capita) nding a positive and robust association. All these contributions (and many similar ones which I omit for brevity) highlight that knowledge spillovers have a geographically limited distance decay.
The nature and causes of knowledge spillovers are still debated. For instance, Breschi and Lissoni (2009) , building on previous contributions by Breschi and Lissoni (2001) , Zucker et al (1998) , and Almeida and Kogut (1999) , highlight that dening localized knowledge spillovers as an externality can be misleading, as most of the knowledge diusion may take place through market interactions -namely the spatially-bounded mobility of inventors among workplacesrather than through informal contacts. Using data on US inventors' applications to the European Patent Oce, they were able to show that after controlling for inventors' labour mobility and the related professional network, the role of proximity in explaining knowledge diusion is greatly 3 These ndings have been strongly criticized by Thompson and Fox-Kean (2005) , who argue that the methodology underlying the construction of the control group is seriously awed. With a more robust approach, based on a ner technological classication of patents, the main results of the paper disappear. However, Murata et al. (2013) perform a similar analysis adopting a continuous denition of space (i.e., abstracting from MSA boundaries) to nd that, even when controlling for the ne technological classication, the results of Jae et al. (1993) are conrmed. These issues are related to the growing interest in peer eects in science and in the spillovers originating from star scientists. Azoulay et al. (2010) exploit the exogenous variation in the number of "superstar scientists" in US universities due to the sudden death of these individuals to estimate the loss in productivity of their collaborators. They nd an average 5-10% decline in their average publication rates, starting 3-4 years after the superstars' death and enduring over time, but no dierential eect for co-located collaborators. Waldinger (2010) estimates the eect of the dismissal of scientists from Germany universities during Nazism. Similarly to Azoulay et al., he nds a strong eect on coauthors (13-18%), but no signicant eects at department level.
Therefore, both studies challenge the existence of localized positive spillovers originating from stars in academic environments.
Similarly, the advocates of the "death of distance" theory argue for a decreasing importance of the role of spatial proximity following the progress of communication technologies (e.g., Friedman, 2005; Quah, 1999; Cairncross, 1997) . On the other side, a few studies maintain that technological progress has actually increased the scope for proximity for innovative activities due to the greater importance of face-to-face contacts and agglomeration externalities (e.g., Coyle, 1999) . The few empirical assessments of the issue seem to support the "death of distance" hypothesis (Grith et al., 2011; Ioannides et al., 2008) , indeed suggesting that localized knowledge spillovers are fading over time.
The relationship between highly inventive companies and other inventors have been much less explored: to the best of my knowledge, contributions on the subject are conned to the role played by academic star scientists on other researchers (e.g., Azoulay et al., 2010; Oettl, 2012) , while industrial patenting is not considered, the only exceptions being Fons-Rosen (2010) and Agrawal et al. (Forthcoming) . Fons-Rosen (2010) uses data on the entry of foreign rms into Central and Eastern Europe during the 1990s to analyze the eect on knowledge ows on local incumbent inventors; he compares the MNEs which won the privatization bids with the control group of those which also applied to the bid but lost, nding that winners receive 20% more citations by local inventors, on average, than losers. Dierently from this paper, its analysis is at national level and is limited to patent citations. Agrawal et al. (Forthcoming) explore the spatial distribution of large and small (patenting) labs across US MSAs, nding that the birth rate of new start-ups (dened using patents led for by inventors who were previously employed by large labs) is higher in metropolitan areas which are more diverse, i.e., where large and small labs coexist.
Non-TIC patents, however, can be very important for economic growth. Balasubramanian and Sivadasan (2011) link patent records to Census rm data for the US, in order to assess the impact of patents on rm performance. They focus in particular on rms that patent for the rst time, and nd a signicant and large eect of the rst patent on rm growth (but, interestingly, little change in factor productivity).
For local development policies, patents by smaller innovators are probably more relevant than patents led for by TICs. To the extent that the latter are the outcome of formal R&D activity of large companies, they may have weaker implications on the local economy. Since patenting rms are generally large (Balasubramanian and Sivadasan, 2011) , they are often multilocated, and the productivity gains of these inventions are spread across the dierent plants (and localities). 6 Following a common practice in the patent literature, the geographical location of the patent is derived from the city reported in the rst inventor's address eld. More details on the data, the geographical assignment, and the geocoding process are reported in Appendix A.
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At rst glance, the abundance of data makes a micro analysis at inventor or applicant level the most appealing alternative. A deeper view, however, reveals the complexity of such an approach, because the dataset is about patents, not inventors or applicants, implying that when an inventor or applicant is not patenting, her location and activity status are unknown. Furthermore, there is not an unique inventor identier in the original dataset, and the only information available is full name and city of residence. Spelling errors are frequent. As a consequence, the longitudinal tracking of inventors would require a fuzzy matching of names and cities of residence, with inevitable errors which can easily be non random (e.g., more frequent in cities where duplicate 4 The dataset is described in details in Hall et al., 2001. 5 The applicant is the legal entity -either a company or an individual -which owns the right to exploit the invention. In the large majority of cases, the applicant is the employer of the inventor. 6 The sixth technological category, called "other", is a residual classication and is excluded. 7 The NBER database has recently been extended until the 2006 or 2008, depending on the version. However, inventors data are not publicly available yet; without information on the city of residence of inventors,it is not possible to correctly geolocate the patents, therefore the date cannot be used here.
surnames are more common, or with a higher rate of inventors with foreign origins). The problem would be perhaps negligible if the focus was only on very productive inventors or applicants; but given that I am interested also in occasional inventors, the issue is crucial.
The analysis is therefore run at city level, focusing on the number of patents produced by two groups of applicants: TICs and other applicants. The classication of patents into the two groups is based on the total number of patents granted to the applicant over the whole period of analysis (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) : TIC patents are assigned to the most inventive companies in a given technological category. There are many dierent ways in which the most inventive companies can be dened: among those, one can adopt a relative cut-o (e.g., the top 1%), a xed patent threshold (e.g., more than 1,000 patents), or a ranking rule. I opt for the last method: the most inventive companies are dened as those ranked among the top 50 in their technological category; this corresponds to a lower threshold of 247 patents and a maximum of 701 patents across the ve categories. The xed threshold is preferred to using a relative cut-o as the latter may make the denition of TICs endogenous across categories: stronger positive eects of TIC patents on non-TIC patents increase the number of TIC companies and therefore inate the denominator of the relative cut-o, increasing the TIC threshold and lowering the number of TIC patents.
This would lead to overestimating of the eect of TICs. Another reason to prefer a rank-based denition is that the total number of active rms is not a very meaningful gure in the patent database, as the same rm may be counted more than once. The following step is the denition of the temporal dimension of the analysis. Patent data 8 The unique identier for small companies is derived from name harmonization and it might not be fully reliable for smaller companies due to spelling errors, homonymy, and changes of name across time; the identier for large companies is somehow more reliable, due to their smaller number and the notoriety of their dierent denominations.
9 A drawback of using citation-weighted patent counts is the censoring of forward citation information for the later years in the sample. 6 are rather imprecise in the time dimension: usually a patent is granted 10 2-3 years after the rst application; and it is not possible to know how long an inventor has been working on a patent before applying for it. Timing when local knowledge spillovers may have eect is also dicult: it could be while both the source and destination inventors are working on their respective patents, but it could also happen a few years after the TIC inventor has applied for (or has been granted) it. By inspecting the data I found that the median and mean value of the citation lag of patents in the same MSA is four years, and I therefore choose to adopt periods of the same length (Kerr, 2008 , also adopt a period of the four years).
11 This is a reasonable choice in order to "average out" some of the measurement error in the temporal dimension. Six time periods of four years each are therefore dened, spanning from 1976 to 1999. Econometric analysis is generally limited to the last three periods (from 1988 to 1999), as MSA controls are unavailable for the rst three periods. I dene six periods, however, as the rst is used to build the instrumental variables and lagged variables, and the second and the third are used to calculate lags of the patent variables. Table 2 lists the rst 10 TICs for each technological category. As it is possible to see, only few companies (e.g., General Electric and General Motors) appear in more than one list. Table 1 reports some basic descriptive statistics for TICs and non-TICs: there are only 164
TICs dened, but they account for around 30% of all patents in the sample, and for around 20% of the inventors. Patents granted to TICs also receive more citations than patents granted to non-TICs, on average (5.11 vs. 3.74).
Being a residual category, the non-TICs are a heterogeneous group of companies. Since the distribution of patents across companies is very skewed -with many rms owning one or few patents, and a small number of companies owning many of them -the majority of rms in the nonTICs category is represented by occasional inventors: the median rm owns just one patent, and the average rm 8.9 .(see Table 1 ). The fact that their patent stock is small does not obviously imply that these rms are small in term of employment or turnover; on the contrary, available evidence suggests that patentees are larger businesses than non patentees (Balasubramanian and Sivadasan, 2011; Andrew, Criscuolo and Menon, 2014) . A detailed characterization of these rms is not possible with available data. However useful insights on the dierence between patenting and non patenting rms can be found in papers using patent data matched with US business register records (Balasubramanian and Sivadasan, 2011) or with the Survey of Industrial R&D 10 The reason why I use the grant year, rather than the application year, is to avoid the bias given by data truncation. More precisely, using the application year would automatically exclude all the patents not granted (but applied for) before 1999, as they are not included in the dataset. This subsample could easily be non-random, e.g. better patents may take longer to be examined, etc. However, robustness tests (available upon request) based on the application year produce almost identical results.
11 I restricted the calculation to patent couples with a maximum citation lag of ten years, as longer lags are unlikely to be related to knowledge spillovers. The citation lag is calculated as the dierence between the grant year of the citing and cited patents.
conducted by the Census Bureau and National Science Foundation (Kerr and Fu, 2008) .
Why should TIC patents aect the number of patents produced by other local inventors?
An increase in the number of TIC patents, due to an increase in the productivity or in the number of TIC inventors, may have both positive and negative eects on the number of other patents in the same city. Positive eects can be derived from theories of agglomeration externalities in cities;
negative eects originate from a general equilibrium approach to local labour markets (Moretti, 2011) . This section describes some mechanisms that could be in place. In the empirical analysis, I estimate a reduced-form model, taking into account only the aggregate net eects of all those mechanisms. Exploring the eect of individual channels would be much more demanding -also in terms of data -and it is above the scope of the present paper. The empirical challenge of disentangling the dierent -but observationally equivalent -sources of agglomeration economies is well known in urban economics under the name of "Marshallian equivalence".
It is also worth noticing that some of the mechanisms described below may, in theory, work also in the opposite direction (from non-TICs local patents to TICs); to easy the exposition this is not explicitly addressed in the discussion below, however the empirical methodology is designed to be robust to reverse causality.
Positive eects
According to the insightful taxonomy introduced by Duranton and Puga (2004) , positive eects may occur through learning, sharing, or matching mechanisms.
Learning generally involves interactions with others and many of these interactions have a face-to-face nature. Cities are therefore a fertile environment for learning: the idea that cities foster the diusion of knowledge goes back to Marshall (1890) and it is the backbone of endogenous growth theory (Lucas, 1988) . However, there is still limited evidence on the channels through which knowledge spillovers take place (Feldman and Avnimelech, 2011) . In the specic context of patenting in cities, it is possible to think about at least ve dierent mechanisms: a) Informal (or tacit) knowledge spillovers: TIC inventors and non-TIC inventors develop informal (personal) contacts due to residential proximity or other kind of face-to-face interactions.
Thanks to frequent direct contacts with the TICs inventor, the local non-TIC inventor absorbs ideas for her projects. This channel is nick-named as "ideas over beers" by GHM and is more formally dened as diusion of information or social learning by Duranton and Puga (2004 Almeida and Kogut (1999) , the previous work experience may be fully priced into the inventor's wage, in which case the spillover is not an externality.
e) Display/attraction eects: the presence of many labs of TICs may attract other inventors to the same city, as they may expect to enjoy the eects of points a, b, and c. This is therefore an indirect form of positive knowledge spillover.
All the ve mechanisms may require some time to become eective, thus they may be found in the data with a time lag.
The sharing of public or private goods is also a source of agglomeration economies. To the extent that an increase in the activity of TICs in a city generates or attract the provision of expensive, indivisible goods which are not found in cities where TICs are less active and that also non-TIC inventors benet of, sharing can also explain a positive eect of an increase of TIC patents on non-TIC patents. An example of sharing could be a display eect similar to that presented above as an indirect knowledge spillover: TICs may contribute to make a city a notorious innovative hotspot, which in turn may attract non-TICs. For instance, for a startup the location in an innovative city may be a positive signal to potential investors. Such city identity asset can be considered as a shared public good. Other more common examples of shared goods originating from the location of TICs and beneting also non-TIC could be specialized universities, testing facilities and laboratories, or specialized patent attorneys or intermediares.
Finally, positive eects may also arise from better matching of rms and employees. An increase in the number of TICs leads to higher concentration of scientists and employers and therefore generates a thicker labour market for inventors, with a more ecient skill matching.
This in turn raises inventors' expected wage and reduces their unemployment risks, eventually attracting more non-TICs to the city, and helping local rms innovate and patent more.
It is worth noticing, however, that both sharing and matching mechanisms can be generally categorized into the group of location (or specialization) economies, i.e., the positive externalities originating from the local proximity of activities in the same industry or sector; while learning mechanisms are usually classied into the group of Jacobian externalities or economies of diversity, i.e., positive externalities arising from the interaction with a wide spectrum of dierent economic activities, in line with the theory of "cross-fertilization of ideas" developed by Jacobs (1969), later formalized and empirically validated by Glaeser et al. (1992) . The specic context under scrutiny in this paper is not an exception. In particular, sharing and matching mechanisms should be stronger within technological categories, rather than between. For matching mechanisms, this should be true almost by denition. For the sharing channels, it reasonable to assume that the kind of goods or facilities that inventors share, e.g. laboratories or equipment, are sector-specic. Therefore, evidence that the positive eect is stronger across technologies, rather than within, would be suggestive that Jacob-type knowledge spillovers tend to dominate over sharing and matching mechanisms.
Negative eects
Potential negative eects may be derived in a general equilibrium approach to local labour markets (Moretti, 2011) , and they may mainly occur through an increase in nominal wages.
Indeed, a raise in innovation activity in a local TIC plant corresponds to an upward shift in the demand for local scientists, which in turn raises local nominal wages in the sector, at least in the short run (in the longer run, workers may migrate in from other cities, but the inow is limited by the local supply of housing which aects real wages). Both mechanisms aect negatively the number of non-TIC patents, since local scientists become more costly, without a corresponding increase in productivity (assuming zero positive eects). The actual impact of these eects depends on the skill substitutability among TICs and other inventors, and on the elasticity of supply of labour (also through migration). Higher the skill substitutability, larger would be the increase in local nominal wages; a more elastic supply of labour, instead, would compress the wage growth. Since labour supply is likely to be rigid in the short run, the negative eects are expected to be stronger in the short term, and then to fade over time. Also, negative eects are expected to be stronger within narrowly-dened technological sectors, since skill substitutability of workers is higher, and correspondingly the wage eect is larger.
Analysis
This section investigates whether the production of TIC patents in a city aects the production of non-TIC patents in the same city and period, and quanties this eect. The model also includes a one period lag in the spillover eects of TICs. The following panel with xed eects 10 is estimated: In addition, the model is also estimated on aggregated data at the MSA level. The three different level of technological aggregation (MSA, category, and sub-category) may give interesting insights on the technological boundaries of knowledge spillovers.
In order to check the consistency of the results across dierent specications, regressions are based on ve dierent estimations of model 1. The rst is an OLS estimation including all the controls. Regressions two to ve are estimated with 2-stages least squares (2SLS): the second and the third include the contemporaneous and lagged TIC patents variable, respectively, excluding all other continuous controls and including all xed eects; the fourth includes both the contemporaneous and lagged TICs patent variable jointly; nally, the fth estimation also add all the controls. Details on the instrumental variable strategy are reported in the next section.
I total, therefore, I present results from ve dierent estimations at three dierent aggregation levels.
12 The sixth technological category, called "other", is a residual classication and is excluded. This does not aect the coecients but increase precision of the estimates.
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The rst control variable included in the rst and fth estimations is the total number of TIC patents in technological categories dierent from i. It is worth noting that this variable might be endogenous: non-TIC inventors might produce knowledge spillovers beneting TICs in the other technological categories. However, the inclusion of this variable has a limited eect on the main coecients, especially with the 2SLS estimator. As the latter is robust to omitted variables bias, the estimate of the coecient for the variable of interest (the number of TIC patents) is consistent even excluding the (endogenous) control.
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The other two control variables included are total employment at MSA, category or subcategory level (Totemp), depending on the specication, to control for time-variant agglomeration economies and size eects; 
The choice of the MSA as areal unit
Ideally, the spatial unit at which individual observations are aggregated should match the spatial decay of both knowledge spillovers and labour market clearing forces. Since both boundaries are indenable entities, the spatial denition inevitably entails a substantial degree of approximation; furthermore, data limitation are particularly stringent at a detailed geographical level. With respect to labour market analysis, the choice of commuting-dened areas, like the MSAs in US, is now widely considered to be a viable option.
15 The denition of the spatial decay of knowledge spillovers is more debated: while several studies have adopted spatial areas as large as US States (e.g. Jae, 1989; Peri, 2005) , available evidence suggests that the eect of knowledge 13 Attempts to instrument the variable with the sum of the instrument in the other categories provide similar results, but estimates were less precise, due to the large number of endogenous variables and instruments.
14 The employment variable is sourced from the County Business Patterns (CBP) database maintained by the US Census Bureau. In order to obtain aggregates at technological category and sub-category level, the SIC industry classication is converted into the US patent classication (USPC) using the concordance table provided by the USTPO; the USPC classication is then converted into the NBER technological class and subclass denition adopted in this paper.
15 See Menon (2012) for a discussion of the statistical properties of MSAs.
spillovers may be stronger within cities, rather than between (Jofre-Monseny et al., 2011), or even rapidly fade out within less than a miles (Arzaghi and Henderson, 2008) . It is worth stressing, however, that the ndings from the latter study are specic to a single and peculiar industry (advertising), and the authors carefully acknowledge that the mechanisms that they isolate are proximity benets for information exchange and networking" (p. 1012), i.e., a specic kind of proximity benets (those listed at point a in section 3.2.1). Using patent data to explore very localized informal knowledge spillovers looks promising, however it also faces important data limitations: only a very small fraction of patent data reports detailed information on inventors' address which would allow to explore knowledge spillovers at a ne spatial scale. An intermediate alternative could be using postcode information to allocate patents to US postcode area, but again the coverage is critically limited -and potentially selected -as in the patent sample used in this paper only 15% of patents report the postcode. Furthermore, US postcode areas are extremely heterogeneous in size and population, and their borders do not have any political nor economic signicance, which implies that a postcode-level analysis could be seriously awed by a Modiable Areal Unit Problem (MAUP) bias.
16 Furthermore, they would jeopardize the estimation of labour market eects, as they are generally much smaller than local labour market areas.
Therefore, since the reduced-form eect that I estimate is supposedly a mix of labour market and knowledge spillovers mechanisms -which denition in this case is broader than benets for information exchange and networking -the Metropolitan Statistical Area is the most sensible spatial unit of analysis, among the limited number of available options. However, the eect of short-decay knowledge spillovers may be underestimated. It is therefore appropriate to specify that the analysis takes into account only MSA-level knowledge spillovers, which may not fully reect other short-decay spillovers.
The instrumental variable for the number of TIC patents
Estimates of equation 1 can be inconsistent due to reverse causality or omitted variable biases, especially for the main variable of interest (the number of TIC patents). For instance, non-TIC inventors may aect the productivity of TICs, and a dynamic university (or public subsidies) may attract a large number of TICs and non-TIC inventors to the same city. I therefore create an instrumental variable for the number of TIC patents in order to allow a causal interpretation of the results.
The intuition for the instrument builds on the fact that most TICs are located in several MSAs 16 See Openshaw (1983) for an introduction to the MAUP.
13 and in dierent US states. Table 6 lists the top 25 assignees in the period under examination (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) , reporting the number of dierent MSAs and states where at least 100 patents are authored, and the highest share of patents authored in an individual MSA: only one company is located in one MSA (Ford Motor), while all the remaining assignees are located in several dierent cities and states. Smaller TICs show a similar pattern. Therefore, an exogenous variation in the productivity of TIC inventors in a given MSA and period may arise from the interaction of two factors: i) an historical presence of inventors working for a given company in that MSA, and ii) a US-wide increase in the productivity or the market share of this company in the given period.
To the extent that the rst factor is path-dependent and exhibits some inertia over time, it is exogenous to contemporaneous MSA-specic factors, conditional on MSA xed eects. At the same time, the productivity of TIC inventors working for the same companies in dierent cities is likely to be correlated, due to the sharing of similar strategies and resources, competition pressure, market demand, etc. Therefore, a US-wide productivity shift in a given company translates into MSA-specic productivity shocks in proportion to the number of inventors working for that company in the given MSA.
The IV strategy is close in spirit to the approach of Bartik (1991) and Blanchard and Katz (1992) , among others, who instrument regional economic growth interacting the lagged sectoral structure of a region with the contemporaneous national sectoral trend. In the next section the construction of the instruments is explained in detail.
Instrumental variable construction
The instrumental variable is calculated as follows: 14 Formally, it can be summarized by the following equation:
where i indexes MSAs, t periods, k technological categories, and a the assignees. In the few cases in which the value of point b is missing (because there are not other TIC inventors with the same assignee in other MSAs), it is replaced with the contemporaneous US-wide average productivity of TIC inventors in the same technological category.
Instrument's validity and falsication tests
The validity of the IV relies on an exclusion restriction related to point a, i.e., once MSA xed eects are controlled for, the number of TIC inventors working for a given assignee in the rst period has no independent eect on the number of non-TIC patents developed in period n in the same MSA/category; and on an assumption of exogeneity related to point b, i.e., given that
TICs and other inventors have dierent assignees, it is assumed that the average productivity of an assignee in the whole US (calculated excluding the given MSA) has no independent eect on the productivity of non-TIC inventors of that MSA.
A concern related to point b is that the address of residence of a few inventors does not truly reect the location of their workplace while working on the patent; this can be due to errors in the data or geocoding process, in the city name spelling, or to a subsequent change in the inventor's address. This would threaten the exogeneity of the IV, as the productivity of those inventors might not be exogenous to local unobservables, especially in the case in which their real MSA and the MSA the instrument is built for coincide. Therefore, to be on the safe side, when creating the IV all the company-MSA pairs with less than 100 patents are dropped; i.e., patents assigned to MSAs which are unlikely to host a R&D lab, and which may misreport the real inventor's location, are excluded. This should reduce the noise in the geographical assignment of the R&D labs of TICs, minimizing the risk of endogeneity of the IV.
A second concern relates to the plausibility of the exclusion restrictions for assignees' shares in period 0. The historical presence of one or more TICs in a MSA might depend on a persistent trend over time, which in turn might also correlate with non-TIC patents in the following periods.
For instance, an dynamic university created in the early '70s may have attracted a productive TIC to a city; over the '90s the same expanding university may aect positively both the number of TIC and non-TIC patents in that city, challenging the exclusion restrictions on the instrumental variable.
I design a falsication test to address this and related concerns. The test is based on creating a placebo IV which is calculated following formula 3, but inventors' shares at time 0 are multiplied by the average productivity at time t of a randomly picked TIC within the same MSA and period, rather than to the correct one. Therefore, the placebo instrument absorbs only the (supposedly) time invariant component of the correlation with the correspondent number of TIC patents in the same MSA and category. If period zero shares were endogenous due to an unobserved MSAspecic persistent trend which correlates with both the number of TIC and non-TIC inventors, the placebo IV would correlate with the number of TIC patents; if the correlation were strong enough, the placebo IV would be signicant in the rst stage regression. The table added to the paper shows that this is never the case: all the coecients are very far from being statistically dierent from zero (table 9).
Results
The regression results are reported in table 5-6-7.
17 As noted in the previous section, the estimations are based on ve dierent specications -OLS with controls (col. 1), 2SLS with contemporaneous TIC patents only (col. 2), 2SLS with lagged TIC patents only (col. 3), 2SLS
with both contemporaneous and lagged TIC patents (col. 4), and 2SLS with all the variables (col.
5) -at three aggregation levels: MSAs ( Overall, the results suggest that there is a positive eect of TIC patents on non-TIC patents at MSA level. The eect is stronger with a one-period time lag, and it is not conned within technological categories. Within technological sub-cateogories, the estimations fail to nd any 17 Standard errors are clustered at MSA level. Alternative estimates based on clustering at the state-year pairwise combination give almost identical standard errors. Since the distribution of total patents across MSAs shows a large variance, all regressions are (analytically) weighted by the total number of patents over the period of analysis (see Angrist and Pischke, 2008 , for a detailed discussion on the suitability of weighted regressions when the sample is composed by grouped individual observations). I also dropped all the MSA-Category pairs with less then 10 patents over the whole period of analysis. Unweighted regression results and full sample results are qualitatively similar but less precise. Logarithmic transformation is applied to the patent count augmented by one unity, in order to keep observations with zero patents in the sample. Robustness tests including a zero TIC patent dummy or limited to the subsample with strictly positive patents suggest that the procedure does not introduce any signicant bias.
18 The Angrist-Pischke (AP) rst-stage F statistic is calculated for each individual endogenous regressors by "partialling-out" linear projections of the other endogenous regressors. The AP test will fail to reject if a particular endogenous regressor is unidentied. Values of the AP rst-stage F can be compared to the Stock-Yogo (2002 critical values for the Cragg-Donald F statistic with K1=1. signicant positive eects, once endogeneity is dealt with. This implies that across technologies and with a time lag, positive agglomeration eects prevail; within narrowly dened technologies and the same time period, negative wage eects fully counterbalance the positive ones. This may happen because negative eects are stronger within sub-categories, and/or because positive eects are weaker. Both the justications are consistent with the theoretical predictions. On the one hand, wage eects, which push the coecient downward, are stronger within narrow technological categories due to higher skill substitutability -and in the short run, before workers' relocation takes place. On the other hand, the positive agglomeration eects arising from learning mechanims take a few years before being eective, and are technologically complementary. Without knowing the exact magnitude of the two eects, it is hard to say which of the two factors contributes most to explaining the absence of positive eects at sub-category level.
However, the results are at least suggestive that most of the positive eects arise from Jacobtype, cross-technology knowledge spillovers, rather than from other sector-specic externalities, like sharing or matching mechanisms. In the following, I will present an additional test based on citation data which further substantiate this interpretation of the results.
The results at MSA level are reported in table 5. The rst column report the results of the OLS estimation: both the contemporaneous and the lagged level of TIC patents are signicant, and both the coecients are equal to 0.09. Column 2 to 5 report dierent specications using the instrumental variable approach. When included alone, the contemporaneous and the lagged number of TIC patents are both signicant, with a coecient of 0.15 and 0.22, respectively.
Once the two TIC variables are jointly included in the same specication, only the lagged one is signicant, with a value ranging from 0.20 to 0.22, depending on whether the other controls are included or not. Given that the specications are log-linear, coecients can approximately be interpreted as elasticities: a 10% increase in the number of TIC patents in a given city corresponds to around a 2% increase in the number of non-TIC patents, ceteris paribus.
When the sample is disaggregated to technological categories (table 6), the results are qualitatively similar to those obtained at MSA level, but the coecients' magnitude is slightly reduced, and their signicance is weaker. The contemporaneous coecient is now never signicant across the ve specications. The lagged coecient, instead, is signicant and equal to 0.06 in the OLS regression (col. 1), while ranges from 0.15 to 0.23 in the IV regression, but loosing progressively signicance once further controls are introduced.
When the sample is further disaggregated to 27 technological subcategories (table 7), the contemporaneous TIC coecient is never signicant, and the lagged one is signicant only in the OLS regressions (col 1). Across all IV specications (col. 2-5), the contemporaneous coecient turns even negative, and the lagged one is very close to zero. Therefore, as anticipated, at the sub-category level the regression analysis fails to nd any causal eect of TIC patents on non-TIC patents.
Why MSA-and category-level OLS estimates are downward biased? There are at least three plausible explanations for that: negative selection, measurement error, and local average treatment eect (LATE). Negative selection may arise because, in general, those TIC inventors that are more "exposed" to non-TIC inventors might produce less knowledge spillovers than the average TICs inventor. In other words, TIC inventors localized in "non-TICs cities" may be less productive than TIC inventors localized in "TICs cities". As this lower quality is unobserved, it introduces a (downward) bias in the OLS estimates. Another plausible explanation for the downward bias could be a measurement error in the TICs variable: the intensity of activity of TIC inventors in a locality is approximated by the number of patents they produce, but the measure is clearly noisy, as patents are heterogeneous in quality. To the extent that the measurement error of the instrumental variable is independent from the one in the endogenous variable, IV estimates may eliminate the "attenuation bias" of the OLS coecient. The independence of the two errors is plausible as the variables are measured using patents in dierent localities (in the specic city and in the whole US excluding that city, respectively). Finally, to the extent that the elasticity of the endogenous regressor with respect to changes in the instrumental variables is not constant across groups, 2SLS estimates may correspond to a local treatment eect, rather than to an average treatment eect (ATE) (Imbens and Angrist, 1994) . In this specic context, it is likely that the elasticity of the endogenous variable to the instrument is higher for incumbent plants, since one of the component of the instrument is the historical presence of TIC inventors in the MSA. Incumbent plant inventors may have a stronger eect, since they are more connected with local other non-TIC inventors; this may explain an higher local treatment eect.
Testing for the knowledge spillover channel
As discussed in section 3.2, positive eects of TIC on non-TIC patents may occur through learning, sharing, and matching mechanisms. I have argued that the results suggest that the learning channels tend to prevail over sharing and matching mechanisms. In what follows I present additional evidence supporting this view.
Citations are often used in patent analysis as a way to trace knowledge spillovers (at least since Jae et al., 2003) . Therefore, is it plausible to assume that most of locally cited patents are among those that generate knowledge spillovers to non-TIC patents, although the full group of patents generating spillovers might be much larger, as not every knowledge spillover results in a citation. However, if regressions based on such a tiny share of patents still pointed to the existence of positive eects of TIC patents on non-TIC patents, this would further support the view that knowledge spillovers play an important role in explaining the positive eect of TIC patents over non-TIC patents. The Table 8 reports MSA-level regressions in which the number of TIC patents have been restricted to those patents that are cited by non-TIC patents in the same MSA. Those patents represent only a tiny minority -only 5% on average -of all TIC patents produced in a given MSA. In all other respects, the estimations are identical to those reported in 5.
The results reported in table 8 indeed support the relevance of learning mechanisms, as OLS coecients are quite similar to those presented in the baseline regressions (col 1). The results can however simply be similar because the two group of TIC patents -those cited by local non-TIC and the others -might be strongly correlated. Cols. 2 and 3 therefore also include the number of other TIC patents on the right hand side of the regression. As it is possible to see, while some of the contemporaneous eect is clearly due to the correlation of the two variables, the lagged eect is almost entirely attributable to the TIC patents cited locally. This result is in line with previous ndings, and are a further evidence that knowledge spillovers need a few years before materializing. IV results are also in line with those discussed above, although coecients loose some signicance, probably because of a much weaker rst stage, as highlighted by the lower AP statistics. All in all, the test is thus supportive of the prominent role played by knowledge spillovers in explaining the positive eect of TIC patents on non-TIC patents at MSA level.
Robustness
The core results are subject to a variety of robustness tests -regarding the econometric specication, the TIC denition, the geographic assignment of patents, etc.
which leave the main conclusions unaected.
A rst robustness test consists in adding a lagged dependent variable to the right hand side of the regression equation, as its omission might lead to un omitted variable bias in the estimation of the coecient on the lagged TIC patent variable, and this might explain why the latter tends to be larger than the contemporaneous one. The model is estimated with a GMM Arellano-Bond dynamic panel; the lagged levels (at t-2 and t-3 ) of the dependent variable are set as instruments Finally, I repeat the empirical analysis dening as TICs those companies cumulatively owning 50% of patents in the category: this also does not aect the main conclusions of the paper (the results of these two last tests are available upon request).
Another potential source of concern may be the choice of considering only the rst author of the patent in the geolocalization process.
19 This is based on the assumption that the rst author is the leading scientist, but it would introduce a bias if authors are listed in alphabetical order.
Therefore I check whether authors whose surname begins with one of the rst letters of the alphabet are more likely to be reported as rst authors, compared with second or third authors, nding that dierences in probability are very low and fade out after the rst ve-six letters (table available upon request) . This evidence therefore suggests that the rst author should be the project leader. However, to be on the safe side, I also replicate all the estimations limiting the sample only to single-authored patents (54% of the sample), or using the city of the second inventor for the geographical assignment of patents. In both cases, the results (available upon request) are similar to the baseline estimates.
The choice of patent count as a measure of productivity of TIC inventors may also be questioned, since patents are very heterogeneous in quality and value. As a consequence, patent counts can be a very noisy proxy. Although I exclude from the TICs group all patents which do not receive any citations, this might not be enough. If the patent value heterogeneity behaves as a classic measurement error and if the measurement error in the instrumental variable is independent from those in the endogenous variable, the 2SLS results are still consistent. However, given that both the endogenous and IV variables are based on information from the same companies, the assumption of the independence of the measurement error may not hold. Another possible solution is weighting TIC patents by the number of forward citations, since the latter has been shown to be a reasonably good proxy for patent value (Hall et al., 2005) . I thus replicate the analysis using the quality-corrected measure of TIC patents. The results (available upon request) 19 In the patent literature, using only the rst author is probably the most common option, although some researchers also use fractional count or multiple allocation. additional test based on citation data, the results suggests that Jacob-type knowledge spillovers, which are not conned within technological categories, tend to prevail over other sector-specic source of agglomeration economies, including sharing and matching mechanisms. These ndings are in line with a substantial stream of research proving the economic relevance of localized knowledge spillovers.
As Duranton and Puga (2004) forcefully argue, most of the urban agglomeration mechanisms arise from the interactions of heterogeneous agents; empirically, it is important to understand which level of heterogeneity really matters. This paper provides some evidence on that, by showing that technological and temporal heterogeneity is needed for the interaction of TIC companies with other inventing rms to produce positive eects.
The ndings also bring in relevant implications for local development policies. As discussed by GHM, policy makers are increasingly keen in subsidizing the local investments of large companies, with the idea that these may generate agglomeration spillovers and benet local rms. Do this paper's ndings provide ground to these policies? Given the positive eect of TIC patents on the number of other local patents, the attraction of TICs to a city may have a positive eect on the 21 local economic environment: in the medium run, TICs positively aect local patenting activity, which in turn might foster the birth of new plants, the innovation output of local businesses, and the generation of new employment. Thus, even though R&D labs of big corporations may have only a limited direct eect on the local economy, as most the of the employment and value added is located elsewhere, they might still be benecial through a number of indirect channels.
However, the attraction of TICs may impact sectors and time periods which are not those directly aected by the policy intervention, making dicult for policy makers to target specic sectors and to grasp the benets in the short term. Note: the rst column reports the number of patents owned by the company, the second (third) column report the number of dierent MSAs (US States) in which at least 100 patents have been authored by local inventors, and the fourth column reports the share of patents authored in the MSA with the largest number of authored patents. Note: robust standard errors, clustered at MSA level, in parentheses. The dependent variable is the number of non-TIC patents. The unit of observation is the MSA-category-period combination. The time interval is 1988-1999, divided in three times period of four years each. The endogenous variable are TICs pats. (t) and TICs pats.
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(t-1). The excluded instruments are IV (t) (col. 2); IV(t-1) (cols. 3); IV(t) and IV(t-1) (col. 4-5). All variables are expressed in logarithmic form. All regressions are (analytically) weighted by the total number of patents over the period of analysis. The rst-stage pane reports the Angrist and Pischke (2009) rst-stage F statistics for tests of weak identication. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Note: robust standard errors, clustered at MSA level, in parentheses. The dependent variable is the number of non-TIC patents. The unit of observation is the MSA-subcategory-period combination. The time interval is 1988-1999, divided in three times period of four years each. The endogenous variable are TICs pats. (t) and TICs pats. (t-1). The excluded instruments are IV (t) (col. 2); IV(t-1) (cols. 3); IV(t) and IV(t-1) (col. 4-5). All variables are expressed in logarithmic form. All regressions are (analytically) weighted by the total number of patents over the period of analysis. The rst-stage pane reports the Angrist and Pischke (2009) rst-stage F statistics for tests of weak identication. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Note: robust standard errors, clustered at MSA level, in parentheses. The TIC patents variables include only patents which are cited by non-TIC patents authored in the same MSA. The time interval is 1988-1999, divided in three times period of four years each. The other controls are those listed in tab. 5. Note: robust standard errors, clustered at MSA level, in parentheses. The time interval is 1988-1999, divided in three times period of four years each. The placebo IV is dened in section 5.1. The other controls are those listed in tab. 5, 6, and 7.
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